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Developing a Multi-Level Fault Injection Environment
Balavinayagam Samynathan, M.S.E.
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Supervisor: Jacob Abraham
Dependability and fault tolerance are important aspects of modern
computer systems. Particle strikes or electromagnetic interference can cause
internal state of the system to change, which might cause errors to the system
with non-negligible probability. Such errors are termed “soft errors”. Bit flips
in the design are good way to model these soft-errors. These bit-flips due to
soft errors are random and transient in a design, making their analysis more
difficult than simple stuck-at faults. Interestingly only a few of the flops which
are affected by radiation cause soft errors, due to different propagation paths
and functional impact of the flops. In order to improve the dependability of a
system with reasonable overhead, the flops in a design which are most vulner-
able to soft errors need to be protected. Each application case can potentially
expose a slightly different set of flip-flops as vulnerable. Hence different tools
are required to confidently analyse soft errors for evaluating the fault toler-
ance. As part of the thesis, I have developed a suite of tools for analyzing
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soft errors. The multi-level tools are necessary for complete fault tolerance
analysis and identifying the most vulnerable flip-flops in a specific processor.
The first part of the thesis describes the FPGA development framework for a
specific processor. Simulation based fault injection techniques are described in
the later sections. The final parts cover analysis techniques and applications
that can benefit from such systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Dependability is an important factor that needs to be considered during
the design phase of a digital system. Shrinking transistor sizes have resulted in
soft errors becoming more pronounced and harder to deal with, thereby reduc-
ing the dependability of the system [25]. Soft error detection and mitigation
techniques have been proposed for each layer of the design hierarchy starting
with architectural modifications to physical hardening of flip flops [18]. The
worst case and least effort scenario would be to let the user of the digital sys-
tem handle soft errors. For example, if the system is found to be unreliable
then the user can choose to run the application multiple times and then vote
on the result. This approach has been traditionally taken for non-critical sys-
tems. But technology scaling has made soft errors a concern even for such
non-critical systems [12].
In order to mitigate the effect of soft errors, better analysis techniques
are required. The first step in analysis is to model the effect of soft errors.
Particle strikes causing soft errors affect the charge stored in the capacitive
nodes of the design leading to a logic upset. A widely accepted model for this
phenomenon is the bit flip model at the flip-flop level. This has been recently
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verified to be accurate by experiments performed by Bottoni et al. [13]. Using
this model, several tools and analysis techniques have been proposed. Each of
these techniques will be in the relevant chapters.
Analysis techniques are important for identification of flip-flops which
are vulnerable to such soft errors. Vulnerable flops are important to identify
because various soft error mitigation techniques can then be applied to only
these vulnerable flops. An example of flop level circuit hardening is the DICE
Latch [14]. A radiation hardened flip flop takes more area, power and provides
less performance. So it is necessary to choose a subset of total design flip-flops
and perform circuit hardening or other such techniques. Hence an automated
selection mechanism for choosing flip-flops is necessary. More on this topic is
presented in chapter four.
1.1 Fault Tolerance Terms
The terms used in this work and other cited papers might be misleading.
So in this work the following terms will be used consistently. Fault refers to the
physical bit flip in the design. It is also called Single Event Upsets (SEU). Error
refers to the effect of such a fault in the system observed at architecturally
visible components of the system like registers or memory elements. Error
is a manifestation of the fault. The probability that a fault becomes error
is the soft-error probability. A hardware model for a soft error is one that
implements a bit flip in the Register-Transfer (RT) level or gate level design.
A software model for a soft error is one that changes the architecturally visible
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components of the system. Silent Data Corruption (SDC) refers to the errors
at the registers or output ports of a system which are caused by faults when the
errors do not crash the system. They are silent in the sense that the program
runs smoothly and completes execution without aborting or crashing, but the
results or the registers are corrupted. Such errors are very difficult to detect
and pose a threat to critical applications. Masked refers to the category of
faults that do not cause any corruption at all. Fatal refers to faults that caused
the operating system to crash. Timeout refers to faults that resulted in the
program not completing even after running 5 times longer than the fault-free
case. Flip-Flops are abbreviated as FFs. Vulnerable flops are those FFs which
are susceptible to soft errors. A quantitative estimate of vulnerability and
relevant work is presented in fourth chapter.
Reference figure 1.1 shows different classes of fault injection techniques.
Among these methods, radiation-based techniques yield the most accurate re-
sults in the shortest execution time. But replicating experiments and analysing
errors in a radiation based testing environment is very difficult. The cost of
setup is also high. Hence, if we eliminate radiation based techniques, we are
left with three levels of soft-error analysis. These three methods provide cost
effective solutions to the problem of design analysis. Out of these, FPGA
emulation seems to be the best for getting high accuracy results. RTL level
simulation is equally accurate but is quite slow for large programs. Software
injection techniques are not accurate but have high execution speed.
Fault injection for a large design has two axes for consideration. One
3
Figure 1.1: Comparison of Fault Injection Methods
axis is the time of fault injection and the other axis is the node where the bit-
flip happens. SW and application level error injection techniques also become
essential because application developers can quickly gain knowledge of the
resilience of their program without the hassle of understanding the hardware
details. For a critical application each of these might be necessary for complete
dependability evaluation.
The objective of this thesis is to develop a soft-error analysis infras-
tructure for ARM AMBER Processor [2]. The motivation for this work is the
absence of a multi-level and scalable environment for soft-error analysis. This
thesis is an attempt to create such an infrastructure for a specific processor
and then generalise the method. The following are the tools and application
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level analysis methods developed for this purpose.
• FPGA Emulation Environment
• Cycle-Accurate Simulation Environment
• QEMU Based High Level Model
• Application-level Tools and Programs
The introduction will describe the ARM AMBER core and the five
stage pipeline. In the second part of the thesis we will discuss the FPGA
architecture for soft-error injection. The third part of the thesis will discuss
the simulation environment and provide some simulation results. The fourth
part of the thesis will discuss application level tools based on simulations which
are needed for vulnerability estimation. The fifth part of the thesis will be the
conclusion and future work.
1.2 ARM AMBER Architecture
For all experiments in this thesis we used the ARM AMBER core with
5-stage pipeline from Opencores [2]. Figure 1.2 shows all the components of the
ARM AMBER System. The whole system has been synthesized to an FPGA
and tested for correctness. The core runs at a frequency of 40 MHz without
any fault injection. After fault injection we had to reduce the frequency to 30
MHz to avoid timing errors. The processor core consists of the following five
stages: Fetch, Decode, Execute, Memory Access and Write Back. Ethernet
5
Figure 1.2: ARM ARMBER Architecture
and Amber core are the masters of the wishbone interface, while the slave
modules consist of timer, interrupt controller SRAM, UART and SDRAM
controller. Further details can be found in the Opencores website
1.3 Restrictions in ARM AMBER
The processor supports ARM v2a ISA and does not have virtual mem-
ory. Hence only older linux kernels supporting this architecture can be booted
on this FPGA. The current linux version running on the FPGA is 2.4.27. The
6
core does not contain a memory management unit and thus does not support
dynamic memory management commands like malloc calls. Hence, programs
which have malloc calls had to be hand edited for executing on this machine.
The C library used is mini-libc which is also found in Opencores. So programs
which used the GNU C library had to be re-written if the specific function
library is not found. However, the tools and methods described in this thesis
can always be extended to other processor architectures.
7
Chapter 2
FPGA Development
Emulation methods remain one of the fastest and most accurate meth-
ods for hardware fault injection. The only constraint with FPGA based em-
ulation is size of the circuit. Typically we cannot do fault injection on the
entire system as this would increase the size beyond the capacity of an FPGA
chip or board. So, FPGA based fault injection methods tend to be modular.
Civera et al. [17] used a scan chain based strategy for fault injection. Our
methodology is similar to theirs in that we also use a scan chain based ap-
proach. However, our top-level and software control are different from their
methods. Antoni et al. [7] introduced the concept of run time fault injection
in reconfigurable hardware. However, this requires extensive support from the
FPGA vendor and significant runtime overhead because of circuit reconfigu-
ration. More recently PERSIM [10] and Cho et al. [16] implemented FPGA
based fault injection system for OR1200 core [3] and LEON3 [1] respectively.
The LEON3 fault injection system by Cho et al. uses two copies of the same
processor. This is possible as they do fault injection for only 1250 FFs. The
core flop count in our case is 3012 and we use a time redundancy approach
rather than trying to fit two cores in the same FPGA. PERSIM also uses a two
processor approach. However, the golden processor in their case is an ARM
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core that controls the fault injection in the OR1200 core.
The motivation for our FPGA based implementation is manifold. Fast
runtime and fine grained control are the foremost reasons. We also wanted to
study the effect of soft errors on a more commercial instruction set architecture.
This will make the development of multi-level fault injection environment eas-
ier. This chapter deals with the development infrastructure for fault injection
in ARM AMBER. We used Xilinx’s SPARTAN6 FPGA boards for emulating
ARM AMBER system.
2.1 RTL Modifications for Fault Injection
The first step in creating a fault injection environment is to edit the
RTL to make it support fault injection. The ARM AMBER core was written
in Verilog. Perl scripts were written to automatically modify Verilog for fault
injection. The perl script finds each flop in the design and replicates the flop
with its copy element along with combinational additions. Figure 4.4 shows
the new design. In the figure, U1 denotes the original flop. We replicate this
and create the copy element(U3) and stitch the copy elements in a scan chain.
The value in the copy flop, along with inj override, decides whether fault is
injected on the output of the flop or not. INJ, inv inj, inj override are control
signals for fault injection. Inv inj determines whether we need to flip the signal
at the output or not. INJ is to inject stuck-at faults in the design. Inj overide
is to disable fault injection after a one cycle or specified number of cycles.
These control signals are controlled by a system level fault controller.
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Figure 2.1: Modified Flops in ARM CORE
The above structure enables us to insert stuck-at-faults as well as tran-
sient bit flips. We select the flop for fault injection based on whether scan in is
set to ‘1’ or not for that flop. For the ARM AMBER core there are 3012 FFs
in the design. All of them are stitched into a single scan chain. We can choose
the number of flip-flops to be bit-flipped by changing the scan sequence. It
should be noted that since we are just scanning in the values and then choosing
which flops need to be fault injected, there is no need for scan out. The initial
versions of FPGA had scan out only for verifying the chain functionality. We
can also choose to scan out the flop values to observe the result of corruption
as was done by [17] in which they termed it latent fault analysis. However,
this cannot be done for large programs.
After successful RTL modifications, the design is synthesized using Xil-
inx XST tool. It maps the desgin to Configurable Logic Blocks (CLB) present
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in FPGA. CLBs form the basic programmable unit of FPGAs. Each CLB
consists of 4 to 6 inputs, muxes and flip-flops. XST synthesis maps a Verilog
based or VHDL based design into CLBs. Synthesis reports of our system show
that the register count increased by around 50% and the CLB area increased
from 38% to 49%. The muxes used in the modified flip-flop do not cost much
because a CLB comes with muxes in it. So, adding two muxes per flop does
not significantly increase the size of the design in FPGAs. This is another
advantage of using FPGAs for fault injection emulation.
2.2 System-Level Fault Controller
The system level fault controller is responsible for handling the scan
sequence. It consists of counters and a state machine for operating the scan.
Xilinx Coregen is used to generate Chipscope cores and these are inserted
in the design. Chipscope [5] is an embedded software based logic analyzer.
We generate and use two cores from Chipscope namely ICON and VIO. The
ICON (Integrated Controller) provides communication between VIO and the
host computer running ChipScope Analyzer software. The VIO (Virtual In-
put/Output) is a core that is used to provide the command for System Level
Fault Controller. The System-Level Fault controller also takes care of gat-
ing off the system clock when we scan in the sequence. The system clock is
activated in the immediate cycle following the bit flip. The processor core ar-
chitecture from Chapter 1 can be extended as shown in Figure 2.2. The whole
system with peripherals is synthesized and an FPGA bitfile is generated.
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Figure 2.2: ARM AMBER Core with Fault Controller
Fault injection is done on programs which run under Linux. Since
operating systems can also crash due to soft-error injection this is a more
accurate environment. The linux version used is our setup is version 2.4.27.
The limiting factor in these cases is that ARM AMBER does not have virtual-
memory management. Hence we had to stick with a basic version of linux.
Also, programs had to be edited to change the malloc calls in them.
The steps involved in the fault injection process are as follows. The
FPGA is first programmed with the ARM AMBER bitfile, then a Chipscope
command is sent from the host PC to initialize the system level fault controller
after which linux is booted and then the program is run. For the first run
the Chipscope command is a null command with no fault injection. The log
is saved for comparison purposes. For the successive runs we send a 64-bit
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command from the Chipscope software to ICON which tells the top-level fault
controller the following details.
• Fault-injection type (stuck-at or transient)
• Number of scan flops
• Flop ID for injection
• Time of fault injection
• Fault Injection Control signals
The Chipscope commands are issued through TCL scripts. For each
run the flop ID and injection time are randomly chosen. For larger programs
the run times were bigger and so the time to inject faults had a bigger range.
To still have a 64 bit command we optimized away the bits denoting injection
type and control signals as we are only inserting transient faults in this study.
We also hard coded the number of scan flops as they are unique for a design.
2.3 Automation with Pyserial
Each time the processor is programmed in the FPGA, we issue the
Chipscope command as explained in the previous paragraph. The next step is
to boot linux and load the application. For this we need a serial interface from
the host PC. A simple solution for this interface would be minicom (minicom
is a linux program commonly used for creating a remote serial console) but
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automating minicom is tedious and since we need to do this several times we
used Pyserial [4] which is a Python library for serial port access. The Python
program would initialize a serial port connection through USB and load the
linux kernel image and the program image via XMODEM (XMODEM is a
simple file transfer protocol used in embedded applications). Then the program
would initiate the execution of the kernel image.
In summary, every fault injection run involves programming the FPGA,
issuing Chipscope commands through TCL scripts, then booting linux and
finally, loading and executing the application. The entire process is completely
automated so that fault injection can be done several times. With this setup,
a minimum of 50,000 fault injections were performed in the FPGA for various
applications.
Table 2.1 shows the run times achieved by FPGA based fault-injection
at core speed of 30 MHz when compared to simulation times for the same
programs. The time taken for the FPGA is 80 seconds because of the overhead
of programming the bitfile and booting linux. Running a large program on
linux amortizes the cost of booting linux and the total execution time is small,
whereas in simulation, execution time increases as the program size increases.
Note that the datasets for each of these programs were maintained the same
for the simulation and FPGA for comparision purposes. Certain programs can
take hours in simulation but would take around the same 80 seconds on the
FPGA. The table shows five reference programs among many that were run on
the FPGA. AES refers to the program that encrypts and decrypts according to
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Table 2.1: Comparision of Program Run Times
Program FPGA Single run time (sec) Simulation Single run
time (sec)
CRC 80 88
AES 80 102
Qsort 80 108
Dhrystone 80 952
PID 80 4680
the Advanced Encryption Standard. PID is a Proportional Integral Derivative
Controller program. Dhrystone [38] is a common benchmark run on ARM
based systems. CRC is the Cyclic Redundancy Checker program. Each of
these applications were run 10,000 times in the FPGA. The application is run
10,000 times for statistical fault injection purposes, which are explained in the
next chapter. The results of simulation and emulation are also covered in the
next chapters.
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Chapter 3
Simulation Based Fault Injection
Simulation based fault injection is a low cost solution to fault injection.
A simulation based environment is easier for analysis as it provides fault tracing
and cycle accurate waveform dumps for fault injections. VERIFY [36] and
MEFISTO-C [19] are VHDL based fault injection simulation environments.
The simulation environment developed by Karimi et al. [27] for the IVM
processor is similar to ours. However our analysis methods are different from
theirs. Our fault injection simulator is built around Xilinx iSim. The simulator
has the capabilities of injecting a transient bit flip or stuck at-fault at any cycle
and at any point during program execution. Special testbenches were written
to test the fault injection environment. These testbenches exercised each case
in the fault injection controller. Once the design became stable we were able
to simulate assembly programs and C programs. Simulation is too slow for
large programs. However simulation provides the best environment for analysis
purposes. Propagation paths are easily traceable and internal nodes are also
visible in a simulation environment. Hence for an in-depth analysis, simulation
is the best method. In order to do both an in-depth analysis as well as fast
execution we came up with synthetic benchmarks.
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#include ”amber registers.h”
.section .text
.globl main
main:
ldr r0, r0 data
ldr r1, r1 data
...
ldr r14, r14 data
nop
...
nop
add r0, r11, r8
nop
...
nop
testpass:
str r3, [r6]
b testpass
/* Write a non-zero value to this address to generate a Test Passed message */
AdrTestStatus: .word ADR AMBER TEST STATUS
Data: .word 0x12345678
r0 data: .word 0xff666f90
r1 data: .word 0xc3a8efff
...
r14 data: .word 0x5a78006f
Figure 3.1: A sample benchmark for “add” instruction as the IUT
3.1 Synthetic Benchmarks
Synthetic Benchmarks are a set of small assembly programs designed
in such a way that while running these micro benchmarks we would be able
to capture the list of most vulnerable flip-flops in the design. Figure 3.1 is an
example of a synthetic benchmark for a simple add instruction.
We developed these micro benchmarks for all architectural features of
ARM AMBER and simulated them. The architectural features were explored
in terms of the instruction set, and each instruction type had its own bench-
mark. The data for the instructions are Hamming distance separated so that
17
Figure 3.2: Potential strength of synthetic benchmarks in fault injection
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they are less biased by data changes. Fault injection is done only when the
instruction is in the pipeline. For example in the figure 3.1 we inject faults
repeatedly during the period where the add instruction is in the pipeline which
is why add instruction is surrounded by nop’s. Since the processor has a five
stage pipeline, the time we need to do fault injection reduced drastically when
compared to large programs. Thus, the main advantage of using synthetic
benchmarks is that it takes far less time than running any existing high level
benchmark programs like SPEC [23] or MiBench [20].
To validate this claim, we compared the vulnerable flop list obtained
from emulating programs on FPGA and the flop list from synthetic bench-
marks. We observed that the flop list obtained from synthetic benchmarks is
a superset of those flops from FPGA emulation.
3.2 Distributed Statistical Fault Injection Simulation
The synthetic benchmarks that were introduced earlier reduced the
problem of when to inject faults. But the design space is still very large and
we cannot run synthetic benchmarks for each flop and each cycle between
instruction fetch and instruction retirement. This is one of the reasons to
turn to Statistical Fault Injection. Statistical Fault Injection [28] applies sam-
pling methods to fault injection and gives an upper bound on the number of
fault injection experiments that are needed to guarantee completeness statis-
tically within a margin of error. We calculated this bound for the synthetic
benchmarks and found out that we need to inject around 8000 times for each
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synthetic benchmark at a random point in design space. To learn more about
this calculation readers are encouraged to look at our VTS paper [29]. Each
fault injection experiment runs the same benchmark for around 8000 times
but with the bit-flip on a different random FF in each run. This provides us
with an opportunity to make it distributed across different machines. Each
run of the synthetic benchmark takes 18 seconds. The total workload was dis-
tributed on 14 servers and entire fault injection experiments were completed
in 5 days. The distributed fault injection environment was controlled by a perl
script on a master machine. The script controlled the load on 14 machines
evenly. One important aspect to consider for distributed fault injection is the
random number generation. We generated the random number seeds in the
master and distributed the seed while scheduling the simulation. We found
that if we generate the random numbers in the distributed machines which are
running the simulation individually, then the numbers tend to be correlated.
In order to avoid this, we generated the random number in the master ma-
chine itself. Table 3.1 shows the different run times and compares this with
FPGA run-times. It also shows how long a bigger program would take to run
in simulation.
Figure 3.3 shows the outcome of running synthetic benchmarks on the
processor. Masked failure rates are represented by the blue region. Purple
denotes the SDC outcome rates, while timeout and fatal are represented by
yellow and black respectively. The SDC rates for push benchmark is higher
because this benchmark tests pushing data into memory and any fault injected
20
Table 3.1: Program run times on ARM Amber25 for each injection
Program Single run time (sec) Total injection
run time (days)
Synthetic benchmarks (14 servers) 18 5
AES (FPGA) 80 9
CRC (FPGA) 80 9
Dhrystone (FPGA) 80 9
PID (FPGA) 80 9
Total (1 board) 37
AES (simulation) 102 12
CRC (simulation) 88 10
Dhrystone (simulation) 952 40
PID (simulation) 4680 195
Total (14 servers) 18.5
Figure 3.3: Outcome of Synthetic Benchmarks
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during the execution of this instruction directly affects the output data. From
the figure we can infer the rates of SDC, timeout and fatal errors. On average
98.5% of the errors are masked in each benchmark, 0.9% cause SDC, 0.3%
cause timeout and 0.3% cause fatal outcomes. This is the reason behind plot-
ting Outcome Rates in the figure at 96% rather than 0%. Figure 3.4 shows
the single bit and multi bit SDC propagation rates for synthetic benchmarks.
These results show that synthetic benchmarks combined with Statistical Fault
Injection can become an important part for vulnerability analysis. This is
summarized in the Figure 3.2. Figure 3.4 shows that multi bit errors at regis-
ters are as equally probable as single bit errors. Hence it shows that inserting
single bit errors at register level for soft error analysis is not an accurate model.
22
Figure 3.4: Propagation Rates of Synthetic Benchmarks
23
Chapter 4
Applications of Synthetic Benchmarks
Synthetic Benchmarks discussed in the previous chapter provide inter-
esting results for vulnerability analysis. There are several ways to determin-
ing the vulnerability of flip-flops. This chapter deals with the vulnerability
estimation of flip-flops. Mukherjee et al. [30] came up with the concept of
Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) of a design. They estimate AVF of
hardware structures like prefetcher, instruction queue, etc. through simulation
or manual analysis. This technique can be very manual and does not indicate
vulnerability of individual flip-flops. Nair et al. [31] discuss benchmarks that
can be used for worst case AVF. This technique is also at the architectural
level. The following sections describe other methods for vulnerability estima-
tion at flip-flop level.
4.1 Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability of a flip flop is given by the vulnerability factor(VF)
V FFF i =
number of times a soft error on FFi causes non−masked outcome
number of times a soft error injected into FFi
(4.1)
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Figure 4.1: Vulnerability factors of the FFs in ARM Amber25 core which cause
erroneous results in synthetic benchmarks
The higher the VF, the more the flop is vulnerable to soft errors. Out
of 3012 FFs in the processor core, only 530 of them cause erroneous results
in the synthetic benchmarks. Out of these, only 9 FFs have a vulnerability
factor of more than 0.8. We cross verified our results with FPGA runs and
found that these flops have high vulnerability in those runs too. Studying
these flip-flops showed that they have high VF because of their functionality
and method of design. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show the vulnerability factor of
flip flops obtained from synthetic benchmarks and applications respectively.
Synthetic benchmarks identify flops which are not detected by applications as
can be seen from 4.3.
4.2 Data Mining Based Vulnerabilty Estimation
Data Mining and Machine Learning are becoming everyday buzzwords
in the research community. This chapter will discuss some of the experiments
25
Figure 4.2: VF of ARM Amber25 core FFs which cause erroneous results in
four applications. Note the IDs are different from the ones in Fig. 4.1
Figure 4.3: Vulnerability Factors of FF’s from FPGA Applications and Syn-
thetic Benchmarks
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that were done for extracting meaningful data from the simulation runs and the
FPGA runs. In this chapter we will discuss combining soft error analysis with
machine learning techniques. Analytical approaches like the one presented by
[9] are better for small designs but as design size grows analytical methods do
not scale. The training data for the mining tool is derived from the analytical
approaches.
Let us consider the ARM AMBER RTL as a Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG). For every FF in the design, we do a breadth-first search (BFS) and the
search ends when we reach the observable elements like register files or output
ports of the chip. Then we could rank each level in the graph based on the
level order obtained from the breadth-first search. The rank of the level closer
to the fault injection node would be higher than the level which is further off
the node. The search stops once we reach the output node or registers. A 2-D
matrix is created for this with a row for every fault injection node and columns
for the number of flip-flops. Let us assume we do fault injection 8K times for a
design with 3K flops. Then there would be 8K testcases as rows with 3K flops
as columns ranked based on their position in the breadth-first search. This 2-D
matrix is the training data for our machine learning models. The results of
fault injection form an 1D array which forms the output values for the training
data. Suppose the fault causes an SDC; then we mark the corresponding value
in the 1-D array as ’1’ and ’0’ if there is no SDC or crash. We can feed the 2-D
array with 8K testcases and all 3K flops as attributes and the 1-D array as
the result. The next step is running this on decision tree models for this data-
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set. Some of the algorithms we have tried include classification and outlier
detection and decision tree learning. Decision tree learning seems to give
reasonable results for identifying the key factors involved in fault injection.
Pinter et al. [33] have used decision tree learning to identify key factors in
dependability experiments of large databases. In our case the decision tree
created from the dataset could be used to identify the most vulnerable flops
in the design.
Table 4.1: Example Training Set
Flop ID A B C X Y Z Y(output corrupted ?)
A 6 5 4 0 0 0 1
B 0 6 5 0 0 0 1
C 0 0 6 0 0 0 1
X 0 0 0 6 5 4 0
Y 0 0 0 0 6 5 0
Z 0 0 0 0 0 6 0
In order to explain how the training set is obtained let us consider a
small design with 6 flops, namely, A, B, C, X, Y and Z. A, B and C are
connected in a chain with A being the first flop and C being the last flop.
Similarly, X, Y and Z are connected in a chain with X being the first flop and
Z being the last flop. Both sets of flops are independent and the set X,Y and Z
is not connected to any primary output. In this small example the number of
test cases is 6, one for each flop. Table 4.1 shows the training set for this small
example. Since A, B and C are connected to output or register file the output
is always ‘1’ when either A,B or C are affected. However the output is not
corrupted if X,Y and Z are fault injected because they are not connected to
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Figure 4.4: Decision Tree with flip-flops
either the output or any register file. Each row corresponds to a fault injection
test case. When fault is injected on A, the cell corresponding to A takes the
largest number. Since B is connected to A and C is connected B, the breadth
first search would rank B next to A and C next to B. Thus the values in the
training set are computed. If a decision tree is run on this training set, it will
identify A,B and C as the key flops causing output corruption
Figure 4.4 shows the tree obtained for a cache based synthetic bench-
mark on our 8k testcases and 3012 FFs. The value of 1 at the bottom of the
tree shows that the path ending at ‘1’ is the most vulnerable one pc sel is
the program counter select flop which controls the next instruction to be exe-
cuted. This is one of the highly vulnerable flops in the design. The presence
of dcache wb write data flop in the tree shows that for a synthetic benchmark
targeting cache, this flop is one of the most affected nodes. This node is
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not a highly vulnerable node but it becomes vulnerable when load and store
instructions are executed. Thus decision trees often give information about
nodes which are either easily affected or which are more vulnerable.
4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
The nodes of the decision tree can give the vulnerable flops in a very
clean and automated process. The disadvantage with this method is that
the relative absolute error can fluctuate and be high some times. This occurs
because the number of instances that fail due to SDC is very low (around 2%).
This causes unbalanced class distributions. Our current decision tree algorithm
which is J48 in WEKA [21] does not handle unbalanced class distributions.
In order to get better accuracy, advanced tree structures like ensembles of
α trees [32] need to be used. This is one direction,in which, this research
can be extended. As shown in 4.4 decision tree analysis shows some of the
most observable nodes in the system. It denotes which of the flops are most
vulnerable. We can, in essence, have a good idea of the most vulnerable flip-
flops in the design.
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Chapter 5
QEMU Based High Level Error Injection
Software level techniques for evaluating soft-errors are termed error in-
jection techniques because we directly inject an error in an architecturally
visible component. We consider that the faulty node always causes an error
in registers or memory and proceed with this abstraction for software level
models. This abstraction in turn leads to lower modelling accuracy as showed
by [16]. But the advantages of software models is the execution speed. For
running long programs and benchmarks it would be good if we have a software
model. Software models gives an instant peek into the dependability of the
application. There are various techniques for error injection at the software
level. FIAT [35] FERRARI [26] and PROPANE [24] are some of the software
implemented error injection tools which are based on injecting error into ar-
chitectural components. LLFI [37] and Relyzer [22] are some of the compiler
based tools for error injection and error equivalence checking. More recently,
Fiesta++ [15] is a more application-friendly error injection environment.
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Figure 5.1: QEMU Based Error Injection Framework
5.1 Error Injection Framework
A similar high level environment for ARM AMBER processor is nec-
essary for evaluating high level error models. QEMU [11] is a instruction set
simulator which supports v2a ARM instruction set among various others pro-
cessor architectures. Figure 5.1 shows the framework of QEMU based error
injection. This is quite similar to the framework of other software implemented
fault injection methods. All the application programs discussed in the previ-
ous chapters were compiled using ARM compilers from Sourcery CodeBench
[6] provided by Mentor Graphics. There is also an ARM GDB in this package
which we used for our error injection purposes. The Error controller in the
figure 5.1 controls the environment. It initiates fault injection by feeding the
program to QEMU and also initiates the GDB. The error site and injection
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time are randomly generated by the controller and written to GDB command
list. GDB takes care of starting the program in QEMU and inserting the er-
ror. The logs are monitored by the error controller and once the injections are
done, reports the statistics. The application can be paused at a random time
and program location to inject errors in the registers or memory. Each fault
injection takes around 3 seconds in a QEMU based environment. A total of
8000 faults takes around 1 hour to complete. This is much faster than either
simulation of emulation environments. However, QEMU does not provide as
much flexibility as either of the above environments
A high level error model based on our analysis from previous chapter
is still in progress. The error injection framework was built to test such a high
level environment as single bit errors are highly inaccurate and do not reflect
soft errors. A single bit flip in the design can cause multi bit errors in registers
as shown in 3.4. These errors can affect either the operand or the operation or
the execution of the instruction itself. It can also cause other types of timing
errors in the system. It is difficult to accurately model such effects at software
level as the parameters we can change in the software are limited.
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Chapter 6
Future Work
There is a lot of scope for improving this research. The synthetic bench-
marks can be extended to be more generic and for other processors. The
processor used in this work does not have some of the features present in mod-
ern processors like out of order execution, virtual memory management and
branch prediction. Our current work can be extended to incorporate bench-
marks that capture these things. Out of these units, errors affecting branch
predictor would not cause any problem. It might increase the latency but
correctness will still be preserved. Hence a better and generic framework of
synthetic benchmarks is one of the directions to pursue.
Data Mining methods used in this work uses a simple approach. More
complex methods can be used to get better results. Mining based techniques
are in general more scalable than analytical estimation methods. Hence it is
another direction in which this work can be extended
Developing a high level model based on the results of synthetic bench-
marks or data mining is another research direction to focus on. A better high
level error model will benefit software reliability estimation. Such a high level
error model should take into account the probability distribution of single bit
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and double bit errors as well as the distribution of errors in register bits. A
generic high level error model is an even ambitious task as error patterns are
different across architectures.
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